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ABSTRACT: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) empowers the 
executive branch to designate organizations and individuals “Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists.” Though IEEPA designation is used against both domestic and foreign entities, its 
consequences are most severe within the United States.  The designee’s assets are frozen and 
transacting with the designee becomes a federal felony. For an American organization, IEEPA 
designation is a death sentence.  For an Amercan individual, it amounts to house arrest. This 
Article analyzes IEEPA using the Mendoza-Martinez test and concludes that IEEPA designation 
of U.S. persons violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing punishment without 
providing the required procedural protections. This Article offers a new framework for 
evaluating preventive counterterrorism policies and provides clarity to a notoriously unclear area 
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In late 2001, the FBI raided the offices of the Illinois-based Global Relief Foundation, the 
second largest Islamic charity in the United States.1  In less than a year, Global Relief had 
entirely disappeared.  The government froze its assets, made transacting with it in any way a 
federal felony, and legally labeled it a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” all without a trial 
or even a hearing.2  Under such circumstances, Global Relief was doomed.  How could it 
survive, when employees accepting salaries, benefactors offering donations, and a landlord 
accepting rent all risked being prosecuted?  Moreover, who wants to do business with a terrorist 
organization? 
The speed and efficiency with which the government destroyed Global Relief Foundation 
and several other American Islamic charities3 is, depending on your perspective, either extremely 
frightening or greatly comforting. Are you disturbed by the executive branch deciding, in secret, 
to shut down a charity with no public legal process or judicial oversight?4  Or are you worried 
that terrorists may be infiltrating charities like Global Relief, raising cash to fund deadly attacks 
against American troops and civilians around the world, and receiving the protection of generous 
American criminal procedures that make prosecution of complex financial crimes costly and 
difficult for the government?5 
Even more frightening—or more encouraging—is that the government is able to 
designate not just organizations but also individual Americans as Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists (SDGTs).6  Once designated, a person cannot even purchase groceries without a 
                                                 
1 David B. Ottaway, Groups, U.S. Battle Over ‘Global Terrorist’ Label, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at A1. 
2 Id. 
3 See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text 
4 Id. 
5 See infra notes 66-68. 
6 See infra notes 17-29. 
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waiver from the Treasury Department.  In fact, the designee cannot spend or receive any money, 
unless the government allows it.7  The designee is incapacitated with a targeted blockade, an 
ancient weapon of the state updated for the digital age, made adaptable, and efficient.   
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)8 authorizes the executive 
branch to use this awesome power against foreign persons and U.S. persons alike.  The vast 
majority of IEEPA designees are not U.S persons; the executive branch usually targets foreign 
individuals and organizations.9  Nonetheless, a number of Americans have been designated.10   
There is no question that the use of the power against non-U.S. persons, who generally 
cannot claim any of the protections in the Bill of Rights,11 does not violate the Constitution.  But 
the designation of U.S. persons has drawn some serious challenges.  American designees have 
claimed that the use of IEEPA deprived them of the right to free speech, the right to freedom of 
association, and the right to receive compensation in exchange for property taken by the 
government, but such challenges have failed.12 
Although courts have rejected a variety of constitutional challenges to IEEPA 
designation, they have not yet considered the possibility that designation is a criminal 
punishment, rendering IEEPA unconstitutional on the grounds that it imposes a punitive 
deprivation of liberty without proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury in a public trial, 
obtaining a grand jury indictment, giving the designee a chance to confront the government’s 
                                                 
7 Id. 
8 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1707. 
9 See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/ 
enforcement /ofac/sdn/index.shtml.  
10 Id. 
11 See sources cited infra note 31. 
12 See infra notes 26-29. 
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witnesses, or providing the other rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.13  
However, as I will demonstrate in this Article, IEEPA designation of U.S. persons is 
unconstitutional for exactly that reason. 
In order to judge whether a purportedly civil statute actually imposes criminal 
punishment, courts undertake a totality of the circumstances inquiry known as the Mendoza-
Martinez test.14  The doctrine surrounding this test has been widely criticized as thoroughly and 
completely incoherent.15  Professor Aaron Fellmeth sums up the scholarly consensus when he 
asserts, “It is no exaggeration to rank the [Supreme Court’s doctrine of the civil/criminal] 
distinction among the least well-considered and principled in American legal theory.”16   
In applying the Mendoza-Martinez test to IEEPA, we can work towards clarifying this 
area of doctrine.  Thus, in this Article I identify some of the holes in the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning.  In particular, I identify the Supreme Court’s refusal to articulate a conception of the 
purpose of punishment as the doctrine’s major problem, and I lay out the three possible theories 
proposed by scholars and judges that the Court could adopt.  However, my central claim of this 
Article is that no matter which conception of punishment the Court favors, IEEPA designation of 
U.S. persons is unconstitutional because it imposes criminal punishment without providing the 
elevated procedural protections required by the Bill of Rights.   
                                                 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); 
14 Or, occasionally, the Kennedy-Ward test.  See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 107 (2003) (Souter, J., 
concurring); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 112 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Department of Revenue of 
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 806 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
15 See infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. 
16 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO L.J. 1, 3 (2005). 
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In Part I of this Article, I describe IEEPA and its use against U.S. individuals and entities, 
noting that no court has yet considered whether such use violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
by imposing criminal punishment without the requisite procedures.   
In Parts II and III, I develop my main arguments.  I evaluate IEEPA using the seven-
factor Mendoza-Martinez, and demonstrate that each of the seven factors suggests IEEPA 
designation imposes criminal punishment.  I conclude that IEEPA designation of U.S. persons 
violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing punishment without providing the 
required procedural protections. 
In Part IV, I briefly consider one potential counterargument that suggests IEEPA 
designation of U.S. persons is constitutional in a few, extremely rare cases.  In particular, the 
Constitution may permit IEEPA designation of U.S. persons when an active war is being fought 
within the borders of the United States.  I allow that this argument may be persuasive, but I 
suggest that we should not expect it to save the government’s use of IEEPA against U.S. persons 
for counterterrorism purposes in the absence of any indication that the legal community is 
prepared to accept the premise that we are engaged in an infinite global war—unbounded by 
space and time—that is being waged everywhere and anywhere, including on our own soil. 
In Part V, I offer a brief conclusion, reiterating that IEEPA designation of U.S. persons is 
unconstitutional, and I identify a few questions posed by the Article’s arguments.   
 In this Article, I offer two unique contributions.  First, I demonstrate that the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments prohibit IEEPA designation of U.S. persons.  Second, I help clarify our 
jurisprudence of the civil/criminal divide, an area of American constitutional law that desperately 
needs clarity.  IEEPA is an obscure but sweeping statute that serves a number of different foreign 
policy functions with little judicial oversight.  The doctrine of the civil/criminal divide is riddled 
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with unsolved problems and confused inconsistencies.  I hope this Article will impose a 
modicum of restraint on the tactics authorized by IEEPA while contributing a bit of coherence to 
our jurisprudence of the civil/criminal divide. 
 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT (IEEPA) 
In essence, IEEPA empowers the President to institute targeted blockades against specific 
individuals or groups.  While the act contemplates application mainly against foreign persons, it 
has been increasingly used against American citizens and organizations in recent years.17  
Because it allows for the complete financial destruction of its target, IEEPA permits the 
executive branch to incapacitate suspected terrorists or terrorism financiers without having to 
build a criminal case against them.   
The text of IEEPA empowers the President to declare a national emergency with respect 
to “any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside 
the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”18  
Once the President has declared a national emergency, he has the power to, inter alia, “prevent 
or prohibit” any “dealing in, or . . . transactions involving, any property in which any foreign 
country or a national thereof has any interest.”19   
In practice, this authority is exercised by what can be roughly described as a three-step 
process.  First, the President issues an executive order declaring a national emergency, describing 
the type of individuals who will be sanctioned, and delegating the task of implementing 
                                                 
17 Office of Foreign Assets Control, SDN List by Country, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ 
sdn/ctrylst.txt; see also OMB WATCH, MUSLIM CHARITIES AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006), available at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/files/pdfs/muslim_charities.pdf; Neil MacFarquhar, Muslim Charity Sues Treasury Dept. 
and Seeks Dismissal of Charges of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at A1; David B. Ottaway, Groups, U.S. 
Battle Over ‘Global Terrorist’ Label, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at A1.  
18 50 U.S.C. § 1701. 
19 50 U.S.C. § 1702. 
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sanctions to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury.20  Second, the cabinet 
member charged with implementation designates particular individuals (people or entities) as 
fitting the description in the Executive Order.21  Third, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset 
Control (OFAC)—the executive entity charged with carrying out the sanctions—proceeds to 
block all property of and transactions involving the designated individuals.  In some instances, 
federal law enforcement entities simultaneously proceed to investigate and prosecute U.S. 
persons who transact with designated individuals.22 
Courts have interpreted IEEPA to confer upon the President power over a broad range of 
property and transactions.  In particular, the Federal Courts of Appeals are united in giving a 
broad construction to the words “any interest” in the phrase “any property in which any foreign 
country or national thereof has any interest.”23  The Seventh Circuit opined that because “[t]he 
statute is designed to give the President means to control assets that could be used by enemy 
aliens,” IEEPA encompasses property that might be used to benefit foreign interests “even if a 
U.S. citizen is the legal owner.”24  Thus, a U.S. person or entity may be designated under an 
order targeting a foreign threat, and may have all of her or its property entirely blocked. 
Notably, IEEPA designation is especially harmful to a U.S. person.  When designated, a 
foreign entity like Hezbollah or a foreign individual like Osama Bin Laden may lose important 
American revenue streams, contacts, or allies. American citizens, however, are completely 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001); Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 
5,079 (Jan. 25, 1995). 
21 See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Archive of SDN Changes, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ 
ofac/sdn/archive.shtml The President will usually include in the Executive Order an initial list of individuals 
designated under it, to be expanded by the particular cabinet member.   
22 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER UPDATE 14-16 
(2007). 
23 See, e.g., Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162-63 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 
Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neil, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). 
24 Global Relief Foundation, 315 F.3d at 753 (emphasis added). 
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incapacitated—prohibited from working, banking, traveling, or buying groceries without the 
consent of OFAC.  Even more severe is the fate of American organizations: it is the rare charity 
or company that can survive a prohibition on collecting revenue, paying creditors, compensating 
employees, and making purchases.  The IEEPA designation of an American person thus amounts 
to total incapacitation, while the designation of an American company generally constitutes a 
death sentence.  
Despite the dire consequences of the designation of an American person or entity, courts 
that have faced the question of the definition of “any property in which any foreign country or 
national thereof has any interest” have good reasons for favoring the broader construction.  It is 
hard to imagine Congress having intended any other meaning.  As the Seventh Circuit explained,  
if al Qaeda incorporated a subsidiary in Delaware and transferred all of its funds 
to that corporation . . . [w]hat sense could it make to treat al Qaeda's funds as 
open to seizure if administered by a German bank but not if administered by a 
Delaware corporation under terrorist control?  Nothing in the text of the IEEPA 
suggests that the United States’ ability to respond to an external threat can be 
defeated so easily. Thus the focus must be on how assets could be controlled and 
used . . . .25 
The constitutionality of IEEPA designation of U.S. persons has been challenged, and 
upheld, repeatedly.  Courts have rejected claims that designation unconstitutionally abridges the 
freedom of speech or association,26 impermissibly delegates legislative power to the executive,27 
                                                 
25 E.g., Global Relief Foundation, 315 F.3d at 753. 
26 E.g., Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 161. 
27 E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1093-94 
(4th Cir. 1993) 
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takes private property for public use without just compensation,28 and fails to provide the 
requisite notice or hearing.29   
What IEEPA designees have yet to argue, and thus courts have yet to consider, is that 
designation unconstitutionally subjects U.S. persons to criminal punishment without providing 
the required procedural protections.30  Clearly, that argument offers no chance of relief to 
prototypical IEEPA designees like Iran, al-Qaeda, or Osama Bin Laden, who generally cannot 
claim the protection of the Bill of Rights.31  Nonetheless, the theory’s acceptance would carry 
substantial consequences.  On the one hand, it would shield American individuals from harsh 
sanctions and save American entities from certain destruction.  On the other, it might severely 
compromise the U.S. government’s fight against terrorism and other national security threats.  
Thus, the question of whether IEEPA designation can constitutionally be used against U.S. 
persons is quite significant. 
                                                 
28 E.g., Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2005). 
29 E.g., Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 163. 
30 For example, the Holy Land foundation argued in the D.C. Circuit that designation unconstitutionally violated its 
rights to freedom of speech, association, and equal protection, and denied it procedural due process right to notice 
and a hearing.  It did not put ask the Court of Appeals to invalidate the designation on the theory I suggest here.  See 
Brief of Appellant, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(No. 02-5307). 
31 Alien citizens, by the policy and practice of the court of this country, are ordinarily permitted to resort to 
permitted to resort to the courts for the redress of wrongs and the protection of their rights,” Disconto Gesellschaft v. 
Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 578 (1908), and the Constitution  governs the actions of the American government no matter 
where it acts.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).  But the Constitution’s procedural protections have generally not 
been extended to aliens outside territory over which America has sovereignty.   Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 
(1950) (Jackson, J.) (holding that the Bill of Rights does not protect non-resident aliens); Kukatush Mining Corp. v. 
SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J.) (denying Canadian corporation with no assets in the United States 
standing to sue the United States for the denial of constitutionally guaranteed due process of law); Berlin 
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (denying a non-resident alien standing to sue U.S. 
military officials for harassment and intimidation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 722 note 16 (1987).  Of course, the recent counterterrorism effort has destabilized the law in this 
area, see, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).  For more on this subject, see José A. Cabranes, Our 
Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE 




The rest of this Article explores that question, taking as a test case the Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designation, the most publicly visible and the most 
immediately relevant of the IEEPA designations currently in use against U.S. persons.  The 
SDGT designation was created in 2001, shortly after the September 11 attacks,32 and  drew a 
great deal of publicity following the government’s 2001 designation of the Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development,33 2002 designation of the Global Relief Foundation34 
and Benevolence International Foundation,35 and 2004 designation of the al-Haramain 
Foundation.36 The designation and ensuing destruction of these charities, four of the largest and 
best-known Islamic charities in the United States, was covered extensively in the press.37  The 
focus on the government’s efforts to shut down these charities only grew more intense as a result 
of two somewhat embarrassing incidents.  First, prosecutors accidently revealed to the al-
Haramain Foundation that phone conversations between the charity’s Saudi Arabia-based 
director and its American citizen lawyers in Washington, D.C. had been eavesdropped upon by 
                                                 
32 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001). 
33 Press Release, Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC Has Designated the Following Three Entities as Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists [SDGT] (Dec. 4, 2001), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ 
actions/20011204.shtml. 
34 Press Release, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Global Relief Foundation, Inc. Has Now Been Officially Listed 
as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” [SDGT] (Oct. 18, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/ 
enforcement/ofac/actions/20021018.shtml. 
35 Press Release, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Benevolence International Foundation Has Now Been Officially 
Listed as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” [SDGT] (Nov. 19, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/ 
offices/ enforcement/ ofac/ actions/20021119.shtml. 
36 Press Release, Office of Foreign Assets Control, The Following Entity Which Had Previously Been Listed as 
[BPI-PA] Has Now Been Listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist “[SDGT]”, (Sept. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20040909.shtml. 
37 See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, In U.S., Muslims Alter Their Giving, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2002, at A1; John Mintz, 
U.S. Labels Muslim Charity as Terrorist Group, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2002, at A2; Hanna Rosin, U.S. Raids 
Offices of 2 Muslim Charities, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at A28; Neely Tucker, Muslim Charity’s Lawsuit Raises 
‘Distressing’ Issues, Judge Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2002, at A4. 
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the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program.38  Second, the Department of Justice struggled to 
obtain a guilty verdict in a criminal case against the Holy Land Foundation.39  
 It is important to note that the government has used IEEPA designation against U.S. 
persons only rarely, and against U.S. individuals, as opposed to entities, even more rarely still.40  
Nonetheless, it has done so and will do so in the future.  Much depends on whether the 
Constitution allows such use.  IEEPA designation allows the government to incapacitate 
allegedly dangerous Americans without having to obtain admissible evidence that proves guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and it prevents Americans accused of being dangerous from 
defending themselves against those accusations in a court of law.  The liberty of individuals and 
the security of the United States hang in the balance.   
 
II. THE MENDOZA-MARTINEZ TEST 
A. An Overview of the Test 
Since the 1963 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez41 decision holding the revocation of draft 
evaders’ citizenship unconstitutional because it was not accompanied by criminal procedural 
protections, the Supreme Court has employed a seven-factor totality-of-the-circumstances test to 
determine whether a putatively civil statute is in fact criminal.  Despite having used it in a great 
many recent cases, however, the Court’s application of the test remains deeply confused and the 
doctrine that has grown up around it is thoroughly incoherent.  
                                                 
38 Carol D. Leonnig & Mary Beth Sheridan, Saudi Group Alleges Wiretapping by U.S., WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2006, 
at A1. 
39 Carrie Johnson & Walter Pincus, Terrorism Financing Case Back in Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2008, at A2. 
40 See Office of Foreign Assets Control, SDN List by Country, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ 
sdn/ctrylst.txt. 
41 372 U.S. 144 (1963) 
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This incoherence has been frequently noted by commentators.  As Professor Aaron 
Fellmeth bluntly puts it, “It is no exaggeration to rank the [Court’s doctrine of the civil/criminal] 
distinction among the least well-considered and principled in American legal theory.”42  In 1998, 
Professor Wayne Logan observed that “[d]espite its importance, the Court’s numerous decisions 
in this area have amounted to an incoherent muddle. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to 
identify an area of constitutional law that betrays a greater conceptual incoherence.”43  Now, 
more than a decade later, despite a number of intervening decisions, Professor Thomas Colby 
offers Logan’s derision as a still-accurate assessment of the current doctrine.44   
This incoherence stems not just from a fickle and unprincipled application of the test by 
the Court,45 but also by the great degree of uncertainty inherent in the test itself.46  To determine 
                                                 
42 Fellmeth, supra note 16, at 3. 
43 Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 
1268 (1998); see also id. at 1281 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s case law on the punishment question in recent times has 
been so inconsistent that it borders on the unintelligible, evidencing a decidedly circular, at times patently result-
driven effort to distinguish whether a sanction is ‘civil’ or ‘criminal,’ ‘preventive’ or ‘punitive,’ ‘regulatory’ or 
‘retributive.’”). 
44 Thomas Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive 
Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 447 (2008); see also Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological Approach to Modern 
Forfeiture Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3 (1999) 
(“[B]y simply invoking historical precedent as a talismanic answer to today’s judicial riddles, the Court fails to 
provide any analysis of how that precedent might be justified.”). 
45 In cases implicating the civil/criminal divide, the Court tailors its opinions to the specific facts at issue to an 
extreme degree.  For example in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the Court approved and labeled civil a 
broad interpretation of the statute, when faced with a rather extreme record; the Court noted that the respondent-
defendant, Hendricks, had “explained that when he ‘gets stressed out,’ he ‘can't control the urge’ to molest children . 
. . . [and] he stated that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing children in the future was ‘to die.’” 
521 U.S. at 355. Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court did not rely on any of those facts in reaching the holding, 
however, ruling that the statute was constitutional even though it covered individuals with far more control over 
their behavior than Hendricks possessed.  But Justice Kennedy wrote a short concurrence, indicating that his joined 
the majority only because of the particular facts of the case.  521 U.S. at 371-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  He 
explicitly left open the possibility that examining the further application of the statute could lead him to conclude 
that it in fact imposed criminal punishment. Id. at 373.  Sure enough, just five years later, in Crane, the same statute 
was once again before the Court.   Justice Kennedy, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, 
combined with the four Hendricks dissenters to issue an opinion authored by Justice Breyer arguing that Hendricks 
had only approved the civil commitment of dangerous persons suffering from mental abnormalities who find it 
“difficult, if not impossible” to control their behavior, not the entire class of individuals with mental abnormalities or 
emotional disorders covered by the Kansas statute.   Crane, 534 U.S. at 411-14.  In short, Crane obscured any 
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whether a statute imposes criminal punishment, the Mendoza-Martinez test considers the 
following factors:  
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has 
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is 
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned . . . .47 
Yet, these factors “often point in differing directions”48 and are regarded by the Court as 
“helpful” but “certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive.”49  Furthermore, though the Court 
stresses that “‘only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform 
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,’”50 Justice Breyer has 
observed that “the limitation that the language suggests is not consistent with what the Court has 
actually done.  Rather, in fact if not in theory, the Court has simply applied . . . [the Mendoza-
Martinez] factors to the matter at hand.”51  Accordingly, it is impossible to predict with any 
certainty what the Court will find persuasive when evaluating a new statute. 
                                                                                                                                                             
clarity that a careful observer might have been able to draw out of Hendricks about the Court’s theory of the 
Constitution’s criminal procedure regime.    
46 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“No matter how 
often the Court may repeat and manipulate multifactor tests that have been applied in wholly dissimilar cases 
involving only one or two of these three aspects of these statutory sanctions, it will never persuade me that . . . [the 
sanctions] are not . . . punishment.”) 
47 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. 
48 Id. at 169. 
49 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980) 
50 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)). 
51 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Justice 
Ginsburg); see also id. at 112-14 (Souter, J., concurring).  Moreover, several of the Court’s members have 
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Thus, we must approach the task of applying the Mendoza-Martinez test to IEEPA 
designation with some trepidation.  The test simply cannot offer a clear answer.  Nonetheless, 
considering each factor in turn suggests that, under Mendoza-Martinez, IEEPA designation is 
criminal punishment.  
 
B. The Test’s First Five Factors 
The first five factors strongly suggest that designation is criminal punishment.  First, 
designation is obviously an affirmative disability or restraint.  The loss of the freedom to work, 
travel, enter into contracts, use a bank, or make purchases of any kind without specific 
government authorization is as disabling or restraining as any sanction short of incarceration.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified a variety of far less restrictive measures affirmative 
disabilities or restraints, including moderate monetary penalties.52    
Second, IEEPA designation’s constitutive elements are all paradigmatic historical 
punishments—the state seizes all of the designee’s property, publicly labels her a “terrorist”, and 
casts her out of the community by forbidding all others from interacting with her.53  Indeed, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Smith v. Doe54 makes that abundantly clear.  While 
rejecting the argument that sex-offender registration was similar to historical punishments, 
Justice Kennedy offered an account of historical punishment that reads like a description of 
IEEPA designation: 
Some colonial punishments indeed were meant to inflict public disgrace. 
Humiliated offenders were required to stand in public with signs cataloguing their 
                                                                                                                                                             
questioned the utility of following the ”clearest proof” approach in all cases.   See Doe, 538 U.S. at 107, 110 (Souter, 
J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 114-15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Breyer). 
52 See, e.g, Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994). 
53 See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text. 
54 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
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offenses. . . . At times the labeling would be permanent: A murderer might be 
branded with an “M,” and a thief with a “T.” . . . The aim was to make these 
offenders suffer permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the 
community. . . . The most serious offenders were banished, after which they could 
neither return to their original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted 
easily into a new one. . . . Punishments such as whipping, pillory, and branding 
inflicted physical pain and staged a direct confrontation between the offender and 
the public. Even punishments that lacked the corporal component, such as public 
shaming, humiliation, and banishment, involved more than the dissemination of 
information. They either held the person up before his fellow citizens for face-to-
face shaming or expelled him from the community.55  
IEEPA designation is an updated version of such tactics—it brands a designee with the letters of 
shame “SDGT,” forbids members of the community from interacting with the designee and 
which stages a direct confrontation through press releases and office raids.56 
Third, while the Executive Order that creates the SDGT designation is unclear about 
whether it carries a scienter requirement,57 it seems that in practice OFAC will only designate 
individuals after a finding of scienter.  Certainly, the OFAC announcements announcing new 
designations suggest that designees are intentionally nefarious and treat a guilty mind as an 
                                                 
55 538 U.S. at 97-98 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) 
56 See Ottaway, supra note 1. 
57 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001) (authorizing the designation of “foreign persons 
determined . . . to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the 
security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economic of the United states; . . . persons 
determined . . . to assist in, sponsor, or provide . . . support . . . of, such act of terrorism . . . or . . . to be otherwise 
associated with those persons . . . .”). 
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important component in the public explanation of a designation.58  And for good reason—the 
intensive and costly process of designation would be a bizarrely inefficient solution to the 
problem of someone unknowingly or non-recklessly committing or supporting terrorist acts.  
Presumably, most Americans accidentally supporting terrorism would stop the behavior in 
question immediately when informed of its consequences.  Accordingly, designation probably 
carries a scienter requirement in theory, and in any case certainly carries one in practice. 
Fourth, designation will undoubtedly promote retribution and deterrence.59  Whether or 
not it is intended primarily to achieve those aims, it furthers them both.  As a publicly inflicted 
severe deprivation of the liberty of accused terrorists, it deters those who might consider 
participating in or supporting terrorism in the future and retributively imposes suffering upon 
those alleged to have done wrong.  In particular, by making criminals out of all those who 
transact with an SDGT, IEEPA designation very clearly morally condemns designees.  Indeed, 
the message is that they are moral outcasts, forbidden from participating in their normal 
community life.  
Occasionally,60 the Court has offered an alternative account of the “promotes retribution 
and deterrence” factor of the test, effectively treating the word “promotes” as if it were 
“intends”.  Most notably, Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in Kansas v. Hendricks 
                                                 
58 Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2009 OFAC Recent Actions, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ 
actions/index.shtml. 
59 In fact, more often than not affirmative disabilities or restraints serve both of these goals.  Retribution or 
deterrence will not be promoted only in a minority of cases, such as when the targeted individual is incapable of 
being deterred, see, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1997) (“Nor can it be said that the legislature 
intended the Act to function as a deterrent.  Those persons committed under the Act are, by definition, suffering 
from a ‘mental abnormality’ or a ‘personality disorder’ that prevents them from exercising adequate control over 
their behavior.  Such persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.”), or the penalty 
imposed is spread throughout society rather than aimed at a wrongdoer, as is the case, for example, for required 
contributions to worker’s compensation funds. 
60 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,  (2003); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-363; Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 
93, (1997).   
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upholding a sex-offender civil commitment statute suggested that the proper inquiry was whether 
the legislature “intended the act to function as a deterrent”61 or whether “the Act’s purpose was  . 
. . retributive.”62   
This alternative formulation is entirely inconsistent with the test as a whole, however, 
which aims to discover whether a statute imposes criminal punishment even if Congress do not 
intend it to do so.  Indeed, as Hendricks itself explained, the Court only turns to the Mendoza-
Martinez test after deciding that the enacting legislature intended to establish civil proceedings63 
and employs the test to discover whether “‘the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose 
or effect as to negate the State’s intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’”64  Thus, the Mendoza-Martinez test 
clearly must ask not just whether the legislature acted with a retributive or deterrence-focused 
purpose, but also whether the whether the sanction’s effect is to achieve retribution or deterrence.  
Accordingly, we should apply the broader version of the “promotes retribution and deterrence” 
factor that the Court usually employs, 65 asking whether a sanction has the effect of promoting 
retribution and deterrence.  In this case, we have little direct evidence that Congress and the 
President intended retribution and deterrence, but it is undeniably clear that both are in fact 
affected by IEEPA designation. 
Fifth, Congress has already criminalized terrorism and the provision of material support 
to terrorists.66  This factor, in particular, ought to be afforded great weight in this case.  The U.S. 
government has had considerable difficulty attempting to prosecute SDGTs.67  Moreover, many 
                                                 
61 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 361. 
64 Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)) (emphasis added). 
65 See, e.g., Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 
269 (1984); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).  
66 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 2339a; 18 U.S.C. 2339b. 
67 See, e.g., Johnson & Pincus, supra note 39. 
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policymakers and scholars have publicly expressed an unwillingness to prosecute terrorism 
crimes because they feel that the operation of the rules of evidence and Bill-of-Rights-mandated 
criminal procedures will compromise other government priorities.  Specifically, they worry that 
public trials will reveal highly classified information, compromising intelligence sources and 
methods.68 Accordingly, there is an elevated risk that the government will seek to impose 
criminal punishment without providing the required procedures.  
 
III. THE TEST’S LAST TWO FACTORS AND THE UNREASONED TREATMENT 
OF ALTERNATIVE PURPOSE 
The Mendoza-Martinez test’s last two factors, alternative purpose and excessiveness in 
relation to that purpose, are always applied in tandem and are best treated together because of 
their necessary interdependence.  Applying these two factors to IEEPA designation also suggests 
that designation is criminal punishment.  In contrast to our relatively straight-forward 
examination of the first five factors, however, it takes a great deal of analysis and a willingness 
to step beyond the current case law to come to this conclusion, because the Court has failed to 
explain how to apply the last two factors of the test.  Indeed, the incoherence that plagues our 
civil/criminal divide jurisprudence stems in large part from the Court’s entirely unreasoned 
application of these two factors.69   
                                                 
68 See, e.g., John Radsan, A Better Model for Interrogating High-Level Terrorists, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1227 (2006); 
George J. Terwilliger, III, “Domestic Unlawful Combatants”: A Proposal to Adjudicate Constitutional Detentions, 
ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55; Matthew Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain 
Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009); Neal Katyal & Jack Goldsmith, Op-Ed., The 
Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19; Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15. 
69 The Court’s confused treatment of these factors has an outsized effect on the incoherence of this area of doctrine 
because, in practice, the Court’s final conclusion often hinges on whether the sanction is a non-excessive, rational 




A. The Supreme Court’s Under-Theorized View of the Purposes of Punishment 
When the Court asks for an “alternative purpose,” it means one that is “nonpunitive.”70  
In other words, if a statute serves a goal other than criminal punishment, that will suggest that the 
statute does not impose criminal punishment.  While the circularity of that claim is frustrating, 
the inquiry to which it alludes does make some sense.  If a judge cannot ascertain a goal that a 
statute furthers other than imposing criminal punishment, it is a good sign the statute imposes 
criminal punishment.  Examining IEEPA designation in search of such a goal, however, reveals 
that the Court has never satisfactorily explained what constitutes a punitive purpose, or how to 
tell when a purpose is not punitive. 
The arguably nonpunitive purpose of IEEPA designation is to protect public safety by 
incapacitating the designee and thereby preventing her from committing or supporting future 
terrorist acts.  Does that purpose count as a non-punitive alternative?  Initially, a quick glance at 
the case law seems to suggest that it does.  The Court has stated on several occasions that 
“preventing danger to the community is a legitimate [nonpunitive] regulatory goal.”71  Thus, we 
might conclude, IEEPA designation has an alternative purpose other than inflicting punishment. 
Yet, any further contemplation reveals the obvious problems in that logic.  Nearly every 
criminal sanction seeks to prevent danger to the community.  Indeed, many of the most 
paradigmatic criminal prohibitions—such as those against murder, rape, and burglary—prevent 
the exact same dangers as do the statutes upheld by some of the Court’s most prominent 
                                                                                                                                                             
rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is a ‘most significant’ factor in our determination that the statute’s 
effects are not punitive.” (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996).) 
70 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102-03 (2003) 
71 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987); see also Doe, 538 U.S. at 102-03 (2003); Schall v. Martin, 
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
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Mendoza-Martinez-test cases, including sexual assault72 and violence by organized crime 
groups.73   
In the few cases in which it has held preventing danger to be an alternative purpose, the 
Court’s ability to ignore this obvious flaw has bordered on absurdity.  For example, Doe 
describes the alternative purpose as an exercise of “the State’s power to protect the health and 
safety of its citizens,”74 a power which so obviously includes the imposition of criminal 
sanctions that it is often termed the police power.  Salerno, even more gratuitously, went so far 
as to hold that “crime prevention” is a regulatory, non-criminal goal.75 
Unfortunately, the Court has failed to elaborate further.  Clearly, some restrictions on 
liberty that seek to prevent future danger to the community, like the execution of accused 
murders,76 pursue the goal of criminal punishment, while others do not—for example, a 
quarantine preventing healthy individuals from entering a diseased town77 or civil commitment 
forcing dangerously insane individuals to accept treatment.78  Yet, the Court has not given us an 
explanation of how to distinguish the two.  Indeed, the court has tended to pronounce that a 
particular statute’s violence prevention purpose is a non-criminal regulatory goal with no 
justification or reasoning of any kind at all. 
In Salerno, for example, the Court used only the following three sentences to decide the 
issue, even though it was the most important one in the case:  
                                                 
72 See Doe, 538 U.S. at ; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).   
73 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742-43. 
74 See Doe, 538 U.S. at 94 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960)). 
75 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. 
76 E.g. 7 U.S.C. § 2146(b). 
77 E.g. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902). 
78 E.g. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) (“Here, by contrast, the state serves its purpose of treating rather 
than punishing sexually dangerous persons by committing them to an institution expressly designed to provide 
psychiatric care and treatment.”). 
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The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did 
not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for dangerous 
individuals.  See S. Rep. No. 98-225.  Congress instead perceived pretrial 
detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem.  Id., at 4-7.  There 
is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory 
goal.  Schall v. Martin, supra.79 
Thus, the only reasoning or support the Court provides is a general citation to Schall80 as a 
whole. 
Schall, however, does not stand for the proposition that preventing danger is not a 
punitive goal.  To the contrary, the alternative purpose recognized in Schall was the state’s 
interest in protecting the community and the juvenile herself from the effects of juvenile crime, 
which the Court distinguished from criminal restrictions of liberty on the grounds that “the State 
must play its part as parens patriae” and “that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form 
of custody.”81  Whether or not we find that reasoning persuasive, a quasi-parental interest in 
preventing juvenile delinquency is far different from the goal of preventing danger to the 
community posed by violent crime. 
Even if Schall can be stretched to hold that protecting the community from danger, 
regardless of a perpetrator’s age, is itself an alternative purpose, it hardly clarifies the situation.  
There is no reasoning or explanation accompanying the dicta in which Schall suggests danger 
prevention, in and of itself, might be an alternative purpose.82  Even worse, its citations suggest 
that there is no support in the Court’s precedents for such a holding.  The Court cites to just three 
                                                 
79 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.   
80 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
81 Schall, 467 U.S. at 265. 
82 Id. at 264-65. 
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cases, none of which support the proposition.  The first two are criminal prosecutions imposing 
criminal punishment in which the defendant challenged the constitutionality of police 
investigatory actions meant to ascertain whether a crime was being committed.83  The third 
citation is to dicta in a case about federal preemption of state union bargaining rules, which turns 
out not to offer anything at all that could possibly be useful in deciding whether prevention of 
crime is a regulatory goal distinct from punishment.84  
Other instances in which the Court has held that a statute’s attempt at danger-prevention 
qualified as an alternative purpose suffer from equally vexing lack of reasoning or support.  In 
Doe, for example, a convicted sex-offender alleging that a purportedly civil registration 
requirement imposed criminal punishment conceded that the goal promoting community safety 
by informing the population of the location of convicted sex offenders was a valid alternative 
purpose.85  That proposition may feel intuitively correct, insofar as the goal of informing the 
public seems quite different from the purpose which criminal punishment is usually thought to 
serve, and conceding the point may well have been a wise strategic choice.  Nonetheless, the 
concession allowed Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion to leave unexplained exactly what about 
the statute’s danger-prevention purpose distinguished it from criminal punishment aimed at 
danger prevention.86 
Faced with an acute absence of reasoning from the Court, how are we to apply the 
Mendoza-Martinez test’s last two factors?  The first step is to disaggregate the various purposes 
encompassed by the vague idea of preventing future danger to the community.  Some restrictions 
                                                 
83 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). 
84 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) 
85 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102-103 (2003) (“[T]he Act has a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of ‘public safety, 
which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community’  responds concede, in turn, 




of liberty—such as quarantines87 or evacuation orders designed to protect evacuees from 
hurricanes88—prevent danger to the community caused not by individual wrongdoing but by 
natural or societal factors far outside of the private citizen’s control.   Others, such as sex-
offender registration requirements,89 restrict the liberties of a few individuals in order to prepare 
or educate members of the community to protect themselves against potential wrongdoing.    
Some restrictions of liberty forcibly care for dangerous persons who are too young or too 
mentally incompetent to take care of themselves, and through such care prevent them from 
endangering themselves and others.90  And of course, some restrictions of liberty prevent danger 
to the community by depriving wrongdoers of liberty and thereby accomplishing deterrence— 
frightening others who wish to avoid such sanctions—or retribution—by affirming that the 
community condemns certain acts and so strengthening citizens’ anti-wrongdoing values.  
Finally, some restrictions on liberty incapacitate dangerous individuals, making them unable to 
commit future violent acts and thereby preventing danger to the community. 
We now have a list of specific purposes ranging from community education to 
incapacitation of dangerous individuals. Rather than focusing on danger prevention as such, a 
vague, general end which many different kinds of statutes hope to bring about, we can examine 
the exact outcomes a given policy is designed to produce.91   
                                                 
87 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
88 See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:727 (2008). 
89 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
90 This care may take the form of medical treatment for mental disorders , see Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373  
(1986), or detaining minors with the goal of “play[ing] the part of parens patriae” and ‘promoting the welfare of the 
child.” See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
91 Such an inquiry was pursued by the Court in Mendoza-Martinez itself, when it noted that the sanction at issue was 
aimed at the general purpose of supporting the state’s ability to protect national security, Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1963),  but nonetheless focused its inquiry on the specific purpose of exacting 
retribution from draft evaders.  Id. at 180-84. Indeed, the Court used to explore the punitive/nonpunitive purpose 
question much more deeply.  See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960) (offering an account of pre-
Mendoza-Martinez cases determining whether statues were civil or criminal with a careful attention to the specific 
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Some specific purposes are obviously punitive, no matter what definition of punishment 
we are using.  Consider, for example, deterrence—imprisoning individuals who have committed 
past crimes in order to threaten people contemplating future crimes.    Conversely, some specific 
purposes are obviously nonpunitive; no reasonable definition of punishment encompasses 
removing people from harm’s way by requiring them to evacuate before a storm.  But others are 
not so easy to categorize.  What about IEEPA designation’s specific purpose—protecting public 
safety by incapacitating the designee and thereby preventing her from committing or supporting 
future terrorist acts? Deciding whether to categorize that purpose as punitive or nonpunitive 
requires a nuanced, thorough account of punishment. 
The case law has yet to exhibit such nuance.  On one hand, the Court has repeatedly 
asserted that incapacitation is a punitive purpose. For example, in the 1965 case United States v. 
Brown, the Court observed, “Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, 
deterrent—and preventative.  One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is 
to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less 
punishment.”92  Just three years later, Justice Black observed in a concurrence that “isolation of 
the dangerous has always been considered an important function of the criminal law.”93 
More recently, in Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court struck down a civil commitment statute 
it described as “only a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our 
present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for 
mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated 
                                                                                                                                                             
alternative purpose identified in each case); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 319-20 (1866) (looking beyond the 
general purpose of maintain rigorous employment qualifications and asking whether the provision at issue set 
qualifications in order to obtain effective employees or to disfavor certain groups of potential applicants). 
92 Untied States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). 
93 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 539 (1968). 
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a criminal law.”94  Justice Kennedy dissented in Foucha and would have upheld the statute, but 
he too observed that incapacitation is a common goal of criminal punishment,95 a point he had 
made before.96  And in 2002, in Kansas v. Crane, Justice Breyer wrote for a seven-member 
majority that in any civil commitment scheme “the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the 
severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual 
offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment 
from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”97 He went on 
to cite Foucha approvingly for the proposition that the Constitution does not “permit the 
indefinite confinement ‘of any convicted criminal’ after completion of a prison term.”98   
On the other hand, Salerno cuts very heavily in the opposite direction.  There, the Court 
actually consciously and explicitly upheld a purportedly civil statute authorizing pretrial 
detention based on dangerousness.99  However, the Court never sought a specific purpose and 
simply accepted “preventing danger to the community” as the detention’s alternative purpose. 100  
As a result, Salerno does not actually hold that intending to incapacitate dangerous individuals is 
a nonpunitive purpose.101 
In short, current jurisprudence offers no indication as to whether a deprivation of liberty 
serves a punitive or nonpunitive purpose if it seeks to incapacitate those likely to commit future 
acts of violence.  Moreover, two additional aspects of the Court’s civil/criminal divide 
                                                 
94 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992). 
95 Id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
96 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The federal and 
state criminal systems have accorded different weights at different times to the penlogical goals of retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”). 
97 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
98 Id. (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83). 
99 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
100 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. 
101 See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. 
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jurisprudence further reveal the degree to which this question remains unanswered  First, the 
Court has never considered an incapacitating deprivation of liberty like IEEPA designation 
which, though stunningly severe, falls short of incarceration.  It is quite possible that, outside the 
imprisonment context, the Court might be more willing to consider incapacitation as a 
nonpunitive goal than Brown, Foucha, and Crane indicate.  Second, the Court has never 
considered a deprivation of liberty justified purely on dangerousness grounds.  In every 
Mendoza-Martinez-test case where incapacitation was a central purpose of the statute under 
view, the detainee was already restrained for some additional reason beyond dangerousness.  
Most often, that reason has been mental illness,102 though in Schall it was minor status103 and in 
Salerno it was probable cause to believe the detainee had committed a crime.104  Thus, it is 
possible the Court is less friendly to the idea that incapacitation purely for dangerousness might 
serve a nonpunitive purpose than Salerno, Schall, and some of the civil commitment cases would 
indicate. 
The overarching point here is that a great deal of incoherence flows from the Court’s 
failure to adopt some reasonably specific definition of punishment.  The Court discusses the 
concept of a punitive purpose at such a high degree of generality that it is impossible to glean 
how we might determine whether a specific purpose—such as incapacitation of dangerous 
individuals—is punitive.   Given the Mendoza-Martinez test’s widely criticized shortcomings,105 
this utter incoherence is hardly surprising.  So in order to determine whether IEEPA designation 
is criminal punishment, we will have to step beyond the current jurisprudence, and begin to 
consider different possible conceptions of punishment. 
                                                 
102 See  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 362-63 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986).   
103 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).  
104 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).  




B. Three Conceptions of Punishment 
 In the face of the Court’s failure to articulate a sufficiently thorough conception of the 
purposes of punishment, especially with regard to violence prevention, scholars, and in one case 
a dissenting Supreme Court Justice, have offered a number of proposals.106 Upon examination of 
this body of thought, three approaches to the relationship between incapacitation and punishment 
emerge.107  These approaches differ from one another considerably, yet under each approach, 
IEEPA designation is unconstitutional.   
 
i. The Multipurpose View 
 The first of the three theories is grounded in the belief that punishment is whatever judges 
and lawmakers have made it.  This multipurpose approach seeks to understand what exactly our 
lived experience of punishment has been.  It is informed by precedent, history, and close 
attention to the actual outcomes produced by the past decisions that, taken together, comprise 
judicial tradition.     
                                                 
106 The last two decades have seen an increase in the amount of scholarship on this issue, following a sudden jump in 
the number of Mendoza-Martinez-test cases decided by the Supreme Court and a provocative article by Kenneth 
Mann calling for the end of the firm distinction between criminal and civil law.   Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil 
Sanctions: The Middle Ground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992).  Mann’s perspective 
was subsequently echoed by other scholars, see, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679 (1999), and has recently been expanded upon by an even more radical call to abandon the 
distinction between the two forms of law altogether.  See Issachar Rosen-Zvi &Talia Fisher, Overcoming 
Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79 (2008) (proposing to end the civil/criminal divide by providing 
procedural protection based on the power balance or imbalance between the litigants and the severity of potential 
sanctions).  
107 For brevity’s sake, I refer to these theories as conceptions of punishment.  Of course, I am not suggesting that 
there are only three positions in the wide-ranging, and long-running debate about the proper role of punishment in a 
liberal democracy.  However, when it comes to understanding the relationship between incapacitation and the 
purpose of punishment, there three theories predominate. 
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This account stresses the fact that the actual practice of Anglo-American criminal law has 
been marked by a heterogeneous conception of punishment that serves multiple goals.  Those 
who ascribe to this perspective are wary of accounts of punishment that place special emphasis 
on retribution, warning that such emphasis indulges an unhealthy, inhumane urge for vengeance, 
and that the criminal law’s other goals—including preventing violence by incapacitating those 
likely to commit it—establish a laudatory commitment to pursuing harmony rather than conflict.  
At the heart of this view is the contention that there is no single punitive purpose. 
These days, this perspective is not very popular with scholars, who tend to favor a 
retribution-only view of punishment.108  Indeed, one of the strongest contemporary advocates of 
the multipurpose approach, Christopher Slobogin, recognizes that he is very nearly alone in the 
legal academy.109  It is telling that, just a few years ago, even Slobogin himself was one of the 
many scholars who believed retribution was the only permissible goal of criminal punishment.110 
But what it lacks in contemporary support, the multipurpose approach makes up for with an 
impressive pedigree.111  The list of past commentators who have argued some version of this 
position includes Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Hart Ely, and Sir William Blackstone.  Holmes 
did so in The Common Law, writing that: 
probably most English-speaking lawyers would accept the preventive theory 
without hesitation. . . . The considerations which answer the argument of equal 
rights also answer the objections to treating man as a thing, and the like.  If a man 
lives in society, he is liable to find himself so treated. . . . [T]he affirmative 
                                                 
108 See infra notes 123-124and accompanying text. 
109 Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 121, 126 (2005).  For other, 
similar perspectives, see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 9 (2001); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and 
Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO L.J. 1 (2005).   
110 Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2003). 
111 See generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION 29-58 (2006). 
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argument in favor of the theory of retribution . . . . seems to me to be only 
vengeance in disguise, and I have already admitted that vengeance was an 
element, though not the chief element, of punishment. . . . [T]here can be no case 
in which the law-maker makes certain conduct criminal without his thereby 
showing a wish and purpose to prevent that conduct.  Prevention would 
accordingly seem to be the chief and only universal purpose of punishment. . . . 
Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general good.112 
 More than a century earlier, in his canonical Commentaries, Blackstone laid out almost 
exactly the same argument: 
[P]reventive justice is upon every principle, of reason, of humanity, and of sound 
policy, preferable in all respect to punishing justice . . . . [I]ndeed, if we consider 
all human punishments in a large and extended view, we shall find them all rather 
calculated to prevent future crimes, than to expiate the past . . . all punishments 
inflicted by temporal laws may be classed under three heads; such as tend to the 
amendment of the offender himself, or to deprive him of any power to do future 
mischief, or to deter others by his example.113 
John Hart Ely also shared this view.  Writing considerably later, he had the opportunity to 
consider some of the Court’s early insinuations that violence prevention was not a punitive 
purpose.  He scoffed at that suggestion: 
It would be archaic to limit the definition of “punishment” to “retribution.”  
Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent and 
preventive.  One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to 
                                                 
112 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 43-48  (1881) 
113 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *248-49. 
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keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any 
the less punishment.  To add prevention to the list is obviously to say that any law 
imposing a deprivation counts for constitutional purposes as punitive.114 
  Beyond its impressive pedigree, the multipurpose approach has a second and even more 
persuasive point in its favor.  The idea that the criminal law may serve multiple goals seems to 
have quite a hold on the actual day-to-day operation of the criminal justice system.  Over the 
course of the twentieth century and especially after the 1960s, the criminal justice system 
became increasingly focused on preventing serious crime before it happened, rather than 
ensuring violent offenders suffered retributive punishment.115  Penal codes increasingly 
employed possession offenses and inchoate offenses to permit the arrest, conviction, and 
incapacitation of individuals who might be predisposed to commit violent crimes.116  Courts 
developed search and seizure doctrines that encouraged investigatory police action targeted at 
preempting violence.117  “Dangerousness” became a crucial factor in sentencing118 while “three 
strikes” laws and convicted-sex-offender community notification statutes119 reinforced the idea 
that defendants were prosecuted to prevent them from committing further crimes.  The Model 
                                                 
114 John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1311 n.324 
(1970) (internal citations omitted).  This approach to the question of punishment is a close relative of the argument 
most associated with Ely, that “judicial review under the Constitution’s open-ended provisions [should] . . . 
appropriately concern itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political 
choice under attack.”  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181 (1980).  In other words, instead of 
attempting mandating a substantive goal of the criminal law, courts should leave such substantive choices the 
democratic majorities.   
115 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 829 (2001); Kyron Huigens, Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
33 (2003); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 
Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001); Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 121 
(2005); Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide, 85 Geo. L.J. 775 (1997). 
116 Dubber, supra note 115, at 855-927; Robinson, supra note 115, at 1447-48. 
117 Dubber, supra note 115, at 875-901, 908-10. 
118 Id. at 873; Slobogin, supra note 115, at 122. 
119 Robinson, supra note 115, at 1430-31. 
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Penal Code formally embraced prevention as a basic goal of the criminal law in 1962.120  The 
victims’ rights movement121 and the so-called “War on Crime”122 helped to further move the 
system’s focus from the moral culpability of individual wrongdoers onto the societal costs of 
crime. 
In short, there is a very good argument to be made that incapacitation is not just a 
punitive purpose, but has increasingly become the punitive purpose.  Certainly, the multipurpose 
approach offers a compelling account of punishment as driven by a multiplicity of purposes.  
Most relevant for our investigation, this account concludes that preventing violence by 
incapacitating dangerous individuals is a paradigmatically punitive purpose. 
 Returning to our original field of inquiry, under the multipurpose approach, IEEPA 
designation clearly cannot claim a nonpunitive alternative purpose.  Incapacitating dangerous 
terrorists who are likely to commit or facilitate future acts of violence is exactly the sort of 
purpose that Holmes, Blackstone, and Ely saw as central to criminal punishment. 
 Accordingly, if we define punishment with an eye towards tradition and experience, 
IEEPA designation fails the final two factors of the Mendoza-Martinez test, just like it failed the 
first five.  It is a rare thing when all seven factors of the test point in the same direction, but 
under this particular conception of punishment, all the Mendoza-Martinez-test elements require 
the conclusion that IEEPA designation unconstitutionally imposes criminal punishment without 
the requisite procedural protections. 
 
 
                                                 
120 Dubber, supra note 115, at 970-991; Robinson, supra note 115, 1437, 1447-48, 1449. 
121  Steiker, supra note 115, at 791-94; Robinson, supra note 115, at 1431.  But see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE 
OF CONTROL 9, 11-12 (2001) (suggesting that the victim’s rights movements contributes to both the focus on 
prevention and the recent re-emphasizing of retribution, rather than just the former). 
122 Dubber, supra note 115, at 839-855, 991-994; Huigens, supra note 115, at 39-40; 
31 
 
ii. The Retributivist View 
In contrast to the multipurpose approach, the second theory, is highly popular among 
contemporary punishment scholars. Retributivism, advanced by Paul Robinson123 and Carol 
Steiker,124 among many others, argues that the process of imposing criminal punishment must be 
motivated purely by the goal of retribution.  Thus, there is only one punitive purpose—
imposition of a sanction upon someone in order to condemn or blame her for a bad act that she, 
as an autonomous actor, chose to commit.  Under this view, the criminal law is to be used for the 
sole function of depriving someone of property or liberty in retaliation for a harmful act she has 
committed, and criminal sentences must be imposed in proportion to the degree of moral 
condemnation that such an act deserves.  Thus, the criminal law may not be tailored to the goal 
of preventing violence by incapacitating dangerous individuals.  Nor may government impose 
moral condemnation on wrongful acts without the application of criminal procedural protections.  
Under this view, deprivations of liberty that impose moral condemnation for past misdeeds are 
considered punitive, and those that do not are understood to be nonpunitive. 
Retributivists reach this conclusion through different lines of reasoning.  Some believe 
that the criminal process itself—with police, prosecutors, and the terminology of “crime”—
constitutes a unique method for assigning blame and condemning immorality that is necessarily 
absent from action aimed at other purposes, such as incapacitation.125  Others adopt the so-called 
“pathological perspective,” arguing that the criminal procedures laid out by the Constitution are 
safeguards intended to protect the constitutional order from subversion. These safeguards are 
                                                 
123 Paul H Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2007); Robinson, supra note 115; Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the 
Utility of Desert, 76 B.U.L. Rev. 201 (1996). 
124 Steiker, supra note 115; Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 771 (1998). 
125 See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 115, at 800-809. 
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needed, the argument goes, to prevent government officials from using moral condemnation to 
scapegoat vulnerable minority groups126 and from destroying dissent by labeling innocent 
political opponents criminals.127  Thus, deprivations of liberty that truly seek incapacitation and 
are not accompanied by moral condemnation are judged nonpunitive.  Still others assert that the 
criminal justice system’s “moral credibility” will be lost if individuals are subject to arrest, 
prosecution, and sentencing on the basis of anything other than retribution.  Without moral 
credibility, criminal statutes will no longer be respected or followed, and will lose their norm-
shaping capacity.128  Particular retributivist accounts may adopt one of these rationales129 or 
many,130 but all agree that the criminal punishment can only be used to exact retribution, and that 
any statute that does not do so is nonpunitive. 
Accordingly, retributivists maintain that incapacitation of dangerous individuals is not a 
punitive purpose. As Steiker explains,  
                                                 
126 See, e.g., Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward a “Regulatory Model” of, or 
“Pathological Perspective” on, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 199, 205-06 (1996) (“A 
government may have no fear of losing power and yet still desire the suffering of a scapegoat population. . . . 
[G]overnment will select members of unpopular groups as victims.  Given a high demand that members of some 
unpopular group suffer, prevailing authority will be eager to find members of that group who may be characterized 
as criminal.  I think of with trials and, especially, of lynching. . . . the ritual murder of victims to whom some 
blameworthy misconduct was attributed, whether deserving or not.”). 
127 Id. at 204-05 (“The criminal justice system . . . connects the power of inflicting pain with the authority of moral 
judgment. . . . Restraining political opponents on purely political grounds is a sign of weakness.  Punishing them for 
crimes enlists the community’s moral sense in the cause of the incumbent government. . . . [D]ictators [have] found 
advantage in the accusation of criminality, an advantage that suggests the criminal law’s special temptation to an 
oppressive government.”). 
128 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 115, at 1444 (“The strength of . . . criminal law is a function of the criminal law’s 
moral credibility. . . . Requiring the criminal justice system to distribute punishment according to predictions of 
future dangerousness rather than blameworthiness for past crimes can only undercut the system’s moral 
credibility.”). 
129E.g., Dripps, supra note 126, at 201-02 (opining that the “pathological perspective” is the only theory that 
successfully defends the idea of a purely retributive criminal law). 
130 E.g., Steiker, supra note 115, at 806-09 (arguing that “blaming implies the need for a special procedural regime 
within which punishment should be imposed, both to limit the state’s ability to harness the power of blame” because 
the state may try to use blame to establish politically oppressive tyranny and because blame is so painful that it 
should not be imposed on innocents   “and to preserve blaming as a social practice” because blaming is both useful 
for improving our lives and inherently valuable because “it is ‘part of who we are’”). 
33 
 
consider a scheme of “pure” preventive incarceration, based on predictions of 
future dangerousness but not predicated on the commission of particular bad acts 
in the past.  Such a scheme could not plausibly be characterized as “punishment” 
because the state would not be imposing incarceration “for” a past offense nor 
acting “deliberately” in its infliction of unpleasantness.  Blame is beside the point; 
prevention is everything.131    
 Returning once again to our analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez test, under the retributivist 
conception of criminal punishment, incapacitation of dangerous individuals counts as a 
nonpunitive alternative purpose.  Even still, retributivism cannot save IEEPA designation.  Note 
that what matters to a retributivist is retribution; a deprivation of liberty is punitive when it 
imposes moral condemnation for a past act and nonpunitive when it does not.  Thus, adopting the 
retributivist theory of punishment negates the need for an alternative purpose inquiry entirely.  
The first Mendoza-Martinez-test factor—whether the sanction at issue imposes an affirmative 
disability or restraint—and the fourth factor—whether its operation will promote retribution—
are together entirely  determinative for a retributivist.  The legislature’s primary and alternative 
purposes for enacting the statute are irrelevant; if it imposes a restriction of liberty and imposes 
moral condemnation, it constitutes criminal punishment. 
                                                 
131 Steiker, supra note 115, at 812; see also Robinson, supra note 115, at 1432; J. Schulhofer, The Two Systems of 
Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 69 (1996).  But see Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil 
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law 
Distinction, 42 Hastings. L.J. 1325 (1991) (arguing that incarceration, execution, and revocation of citizenship are 
always acts of blaming and thus always punishment, no matter what their intended or purported function). 
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 IEEPA designation, as we have already seen, is a deprivation of liberty and imposes 
moral condemnation for past acts.132  Accordingly, its nonpunitive alternative purpose 
notwithstanding, IEEPA designation is criminal punishment under retributivism.133   
 
iii. Justice Marshall’s Modified Retributivism 
 IEEPA designation fairs no better under the third and final theory of the purposes of 
criminal punishment.  Like the multipurpose approach and the standard retributivist approach, 
adopting Justice Marshall’s conception of punishment will also lead us to conclude that IEEPA 
designation unconstitutionally imposes criminal punishment without providing the protections 
required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
Justice Marshall articulated his own take on retributivism in his Salerno dissent.134  He 
described the statute the Court upheld, which authorized pretrial detention on dangerousness 
grounds, as  
a statute in which Congress declares that a person innocent of any crime may be 
jailed indefinitely, pending the trial of allegations which are legally presumed to 
be untrue, if the Government shows to the satisfaction of a judge that the accused 
is likely to commit crimes, unrelated to the pending charges, at any time in the 
future.135 
                                                 
132 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  This is especially obvious if we understand punishment as a largely 
expressive act.  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996). 
Then, we must place special emphasis on IEEPA designation’ s most communicative elements—its labeling of its 
targets as terrorists and its casting-out of designees from normal societal interaction, both acts that communicate 
moral condemnation above all. 
133 Of course, that is not true of all statutes that aim for incapacitation.  If the government measure incapacitated a 
person through means that did not in fact impose moral condemnation, then a retributivist approach would not term 
the measure punitive. 
134 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755-67 (1987) (Marshall, J. dissenting). 
135 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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To Marshall, the case turned simply on the undeniable proposition that “society’s belief . 
. . that all are innocent until the state has proved them to be guilty, like the companion principle 
that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is . . . established beyond legislative 
contravention in the Due Process Clause.”136  In his view, under the statute at issue, “an untried 
indictment somehow acts to permit a detention, based on other charges, which after an acquittal 
would be unconstitutional.”137  Thus, “the conclusion is inescapable that the indictment has been 
turned into evidence, if not that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, then that left to his 
own devices he will soon be guilty of something else.”138   
Accordingly, Marshall concluded that the presumption of innocence and the proof-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement together required the invalidation of the statute.  Stated 
more broadly, Marshall’s theory understands the Constitution’s structuring of the criminal law, 
from the prohibition on excessive bail to the defendant’s right to be informed of the accusations 
against her, as a procedural roadmap for exercising the power to target individuals with severe 
sanctions.  The guarantees in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Amendments would be empty promises, 
Marshall argues, if the government could simply invoke a regulatory goal to incapacitate139 U.S. 
persons without trial, counsel, or the ability to confront the government’s witnesses. 140 
                                                 
136 Id. at 763. 
137 Id. at 764. 
138 Id. 
139 Note also that Marshall does not restrict the theory to imprisonment but instead would invalidate any severe 
sanction aimed at incapacitating dangerous individuals not guilty of a crime.  The example who uses that stretches 
beyond incarceration is a curfew for dangerous persons.  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting).    
140 For other perspectives that share a similar approach, see Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of 
Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (2006) Steven I Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil 
Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 121-22 (1999) (“The lack of an effective limiting principle 
provided by the Court [in an opinion on sex offender civil commitment] appears to invite states to enact wide-
ranging detention laws. . . . In short, the net cast by a state’s civil commitment statute may be wide enough to 
ensnare all recidivists. . . . to the point where, for an individual who has committed one prior crime, even the 
allegation of a second one could send the person to a lifetime of involuntary detention, albeit one labeled ‘civil.’”); 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, in CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY 61, 67 (Abraham S. Goldstein 
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 Thus, Justice Marshall’s approach sees retribution as the sole punitive purpose, in accord 
with the mainstream retributivist position.  However, his theory sees the retributive nature of 
punishment as placing some nonpunitive purposes off limits entirely.  Under this view, 
retribution is the constitutionally mandated purpose of criminal punishment, and any severe 
deprivation of liberty with incapacitation as its purpose is unconstitutional.  In essence, Justice 
Marshall proposes we add a third category of specific purposes, punitive, nonpunitive, and 
forbidden. 
 Obviously, under this view, IEEPA designation’s alternative purpose renders the actions 
unconstitutional.  Intended to incapacitate dangerous designees to prevent them from committing 
future acts of terrorism, IEEPA designation is exactly the kind of derivation of liberty that 
Marshall reads the Bill of Rights to prohibit.  Neither a punitive purpose nor a nonpunitive 
alternative purpose, incapacitation of dangerous individuals is simply forbidden. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
& Joseph Goldstein, eds. 1971) (“The danger [of the curative-rehabilitative theory of criminal justice] to the 
individual is that he will be punished, or treated, for what he is or is believed to be, rather than for what he has done. 
. . . The danger to society is that the effectiveness of the general commands of the criminal law as instruments for 
influencing behavior so as to avoid the necessity for enforcement proceedings will be weakened.”); Jonathan Simon, 
Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 452, 465-66 (1998) 
(“The logic of incapacitation behind the Kansas Act suggests an even grimmer and more dehumanizing view of sex 
offenders than does traditional punishment.  Despite that, incapacitation showed up as unproblematic because 
Justice Thomas did not consider it punitive.”).  Interestingly, Justice Scalia has in one instance articulated a similar 
theory, based not on the Bill of Rights but the habeas corpus clause.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.) (“The Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which carefully 
circumscribes the conditions under which the writ [of habeas corpus] can be withheld, would be a sham if it could be 
evaded by congressional prescription of requirements other than the common-law requirement of committal for 
criminal prosecution that render the writ, though unavailable, unavailing. . . . If the Suspension Clause . . . merely 
guarantees the citizen that he will not be detained unless Congress by ordinary legislation says he can be detained; it 
guarantees him very little indeed.”).  However, that view is not a theory of punishment, and is instead simply a 
theory of incarceration.  Thus, Scalia rejects the idea that incapacitating imprisonment can ever be nonpunitive.  
However, his theory carries no significance for measures, like IEEPA designation, that fall short of incarceration.    
For the more general view that preemptive measures aim at incapacitation undermine the rule of law, see DAVID 
COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 33-34 (2007); Jules Lobel, The Preventative Paradigm and the Perils 
of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407 (2007); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 767, 781 (2002). 
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iv. IEEPA Designation of U.S. Persons: Unconstitutional Under Any Theory of Punishment   
 Under our existing jurisprudence, IEEPA designation of U.S. persons appears to be of 
questionable constitutionally.  Five of the seven Mendoza-Martinez-test factors clearly suggest 
that IEEPA designation violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing criminal 
punishment without providing the requisite heightened procedural protections, while the last two 
factors of the test are indeterminate because their proper application has yet to be sufficiently 
clarified in the case law.   In particular, the Court’s failure to consider which specific purposes 
are punitive leaves us without guidance as to whether incapacitation to prevent future violence is 
a punitive or nonpunitive purpose. 
 Once we examine possible theories of criminal punishment, however, it becomes clear 
that no matter which of the three major conceptions of punishment we favor, IEEPA designation 
thoroughly fails the Mendoza-Martinez test.  Under the multipurpose approach, IEEPA 
designation has no nonpunitive alternative purpose, because incapacitation is seen as one of 
several paradigmatically punitive purposes.   
 Under the standard retributivist view, IEEPA does have an acceptable alternative 
purpose, because retributivism understands incapacitation, like all non-retributive purposes, to be 
nonpunitive.  Nevertheless, retributivism treats the question of whether the sanction imposes 
moral condemnation as virtually determinative.  IEEPA designation may not be primarily 
intended to impose moral condemnation, but it certainly does so.  Thus, its imposition is 
regarded as criminal punishment under retributivism. 
 Finally, Justice Marshall’s modified retributivism posits a constitutionally mandated 
definition of punishment that favors retribution and forbids the state from depriving individuals 
of liberty in order to prevent them from committing future misdeeds.  Accordingly, this 
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alternative retributivist perspective also forbids the IEEPA designation of U.S. persons.  In fact, 
under this view, IEEPA designation would be unconstitutional even if accompanied by criminal 
procedural protections, because incapacitation for dangerousness is considered a forbidden goal.  
 Only by refusing to adopt a more coherent, more fully theorized conception of 
punishment can we close our eyes to the fact that IEEPA designation imposes criminal 
punishment.  Of course, it is possible simply to accept the absurd notion that every deprivation of 
liberty that prevents danger to the community serves a nonpunitive purpose.  But any honest 
reflection on that proposition’s implications renders it unsustainable.141  Assuming we are 
unwilling to accept a jurisprudence of incoherence and illogic, we must conclude that IEEPA 
designation of U.S. persons violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
 It seems that the multipurpose approach favored by Blackstone, Holmes, and Ely is most 
consistent with the current Court’s self-professed adherence to history and tradition.142  Yet 
under any of the three mainstream conceptions of the relationship between incapacitation and 
criminal punishment, IEEPA designation fails the Mendoza-Martinez test. 
 
IV. THE WAR POWERS ARGUMENT: IS SAVING IEEPA DESIGNATION OF U.S. 
PERSONS WORTH THE COST? 
 Before concluding, it is worth considering one potentially viable counterargument that 
suggests IEEPA designation of U.S. persons is constitutional in a few, extremely rare cases.  It is 
possible that the Constitution permits IEEPA designation of U.S. persons when an active war is 
being fought within the borders of the United States.  This argument may be persuasive, but we 
                                                 
141 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
142 See, e.g., supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. See also Hearing on the Nomination of John Roberts to be 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. (2005); Reva B. Siegel, 
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 195-96 (2008). 
39 
 
should not expect it to save the government’s current use of IEEPA against U.S. persons for 
counterterrorism purposes.  
 Generally, the political branches are relatively free to use extrajudicial force against non-
U.S. persons and they are usually forbidden from targeting U.S. persons with the same type of 
force.  Consider, for example, the targeted killings of terrorists favored by the Bush and Obama 
Administrations.143 No constitutional issues arise when committed abroad,144 against foreign 
citizens, even when used outside of a war zone and in a friendly country, like Yemen.145 But it is 
unthinkable to suggest that the Constitution allows President Obama to order the killing of 
someone in the United States in such non-combat circumstances. At the very least, such an 
extrajudicial execution would certainly fail the Mendoza-Martinez test. 
 There is, however, one situation in which, in order to prevent danger to the United States 
public,146 the government may pursue a deliberate policy of capturing or killing U.S. persons 
outside of the criminal process. That situation is what the Constitution refers to as “Rebellion or 
                                                 
143 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, Brookings Institute, 
Working Paper  (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.aspx. 
144 See id.  Whether they are legal is a slightly more contentious question.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Addicott, The Yemen 
Attack: Illegal Assassination or Lawful Killing?, JURIST, Nov. 7, 2002, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/ 
forumnew68.php, Anderson, supra note 143. 
145 See Walter Pincus, U.S. Strike Kills Six in Al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2002, at A1 (reporting the killing of 
an alleged high-ranking al-Qaeda member through a missile strike by a predator drone).   Unfortunately, this real life 
example is not a perfect fit.  On the one hand, despite the fact that Abu Ali al-Harithi was a private citizen living in a 
friendly country far from the battlefield, the Bush Administration still considered him a military target.  On the other 
hand, one of the members of his entourage who died in the strike turns out to have been an American citizen.  See 
Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at A1. 
146 One particular type of deprivation, which is outside the scope of this Article because it does not purport to 
prevent danger, is nonetheless worth mentioning.  That deprivation is the deportation of immigrants alleged to be in 
the United States illegally.  Recently, the Court has shown little interest in revisiting its century-old holding that 
deportation is nonpunitive, Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893), and, perhaps unsurprisingly, has failed to 
offer a thorough reasoning supporting that holding, though there are strong arguments that it may be worth 
reconsidering.  Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding 
the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 298-307 (2008); see also Fong 
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 744 (Field, J. dissenting). 
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Invasion.”147  During a war on American soil, Congress can suspend habeas corpus.  The 
President may capture non-uniformed invading enemy operatives, try them in military courts, 
and execute them, with little or no supervision from Article III judges.148 And, of course, when 
facing an actual military attack, government troops may shoot and kill their adversaries.   
 Under such circumstances, our constitutional calculus changes with regard to the 
permissibility of extrajudicial execution, the denial of habeas corpus, and, presumably, IEEPA 
designation of U.S. persons.  Indeed, when considering a sanction somewhat similar to IEEPA, 
the Supreme Court made just such an adjustment.   
 In Miller, v. United States,149 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of an 1862 statute 
authorizing the confiscation of all property belonging to anyone who had joined the Confederate 
government, served in the Confederate armed forces, or assisted the cause of the Confederacy in 
anyway.150  In 1864, Samuel Miller, a Virginian who had served in the Confederate government 
and military, was labeled a rebel citizen under the act and had stock he owned in Michigan 
seized by a federal trial court judge in the Eastern District of Michigan at the request of the 
                                                 
147 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
148 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
149 78 U.S. 268, 308-314 (1871). 
150 This statute was extremely similar to IEEPA, though there were four great differences.  First. its subject matter 
was limited to Confederate supporters, while IEEPA may be put to use against infinite number of threats.  Second, it 
required a U.S. Attorney to file a civil action in a federal trial court, while IEEPA leaves the decision of whether to 
designate an individual wholly within the executive branch.  Third, rather than an indefinite and potentially 
unending asset freeze, the sanction took the form of a permanent seizure of property.  Fourth, and perhaps most 
significantly, it did not impose criminal liability on individuals who transacted with people who, like Miller, were 
labeled public enemies by the statute.  See 78 U.S. at 308-314.  See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO 
STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 51-57 (1996); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 1010-16 (2008). 
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District’s U.S. Attorney.151  Miller argued that the seizure constituted criminal punishment and 
was unconstitutionally imposed without the requisite procedural protections.152   
 Only Justices Field and Clifford agreed with Miller, concluding in dissent that “the 
previsions of the act were . . . [passed] in the exercise of the municipal power of the government 
to legislate for the punishment of offences against the United States. . . . [and] the forfeiture 
ordered was intended as a punishment for the offences.”153 
 The Court, in contrast, found the statute in question to be a “legitimate exercise of the 
war power.”154  The six-member majority,155 speaking through Justice Strong, reasoned that in 
wartime the political branches have the power not just to seize the property of “all public 
enemies,” but also to decide who is a public enemy.156  Certainly, the majority contended, the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not require the Commander-in-Chief to prove the enemy status 
of every single rebel official or solider beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of a judge 
and jury.    
 While the case turned primarily on whether Congress intended to exercise its power to 
create criminal law or its power to provide for the exercise of the war power,157 the majority and 
the dissent also disagreed about the scope of the power to seize property.  The Court opined that 
Congress could target anyone whose property could aid the enemy, “an alien or a friend, or even 
                                                 
151 Id. at 274-78. 
152 Id. at 284-85. 
153 Id. at 310-20 (Field, J., dissenting). 
154 Id. at 305 (majority opinion). 
155 The Court’s ninth member, Justice Davis, agreed with the majority on the constitutional question and dissented 
for other reasons.  Id. at 328 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
156 Id. at 305-06. (majority opinion). 
157 The majority allowed that if the act were not an exercise of the war power “there would be force in the objection 
that Congress had disregarded the restrictions of the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution.” Id. at 304 
(majority opinion).  As for the dissent, it seems likely that because Miller was in fact a “permanent inhabitant[] of 
the enemy’s country,” id. at 317 (Field, J., dissenting), if Field had been convinced that Congress intended to 
exercise its war power, he would have supported the majority’s rejection of Miller’s as-applied constitutional 
challenge.   
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a citizen or subject of the power that attempts to appropriate the property.”158   In contrast, 
Justice Field saw the power to confiscate enemy property to be, by definition, the power to seize 
the property of “permanent inhabitants of the enemy’s country.”159  “Their property is liable,” he 
contended, “not by reason of any hostile disposition manifested by them or hostile acts 
committed, or any violations of the laws of the United States, but solely from the fact that they 
are inhabitants of the hostile country, and thus in law are enemies.”160 
 Recent litigation over a similar set of questions has created a role for Article III courts in 
determining the relationship between enemy forces and specific U.S. persons.161  But that 
litigation has generally affirmed Justice Strong’s assertion that courts will not impose substantive 
constitutional limits on the government’s ability to use war powers against U.S. persons, be they 
American citizens,162 residents of the United States,163 or both.164 
 Thus, a contemporary version of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miller may offer the 
best argument for defending the constitutionality of IEEPA designation of U.S. persons as 
SDGTs.  As we have seen, IEEPA designation fails the Mendoza-Martinez test and cannot be 
                                                 
158 Id. at 305-06 (majority opinion).   
159 Id. at 317 (Field, J., dissenting). 
160 Id. at 317-18. 
161 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009); Al 
Odah v. United States, 606 F> Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
162 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding, inter alia, that an American citizen captured in Afghanistan 
could be an enemy combatant); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that an American citizen member of 
Nazi Germany’s armed forces captured on American soil after infiltrating the United States, abandoning his 
uniform, and operating as an illegal combatant could be held as an enemy combatant). 
163al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  In al-Marri, a minority of Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals judges believed an alleged al-Qaeda member arrested in Illinois and then transferred to military custody 
would not have been an enemy combatant even if all the allegations against him were true.  Yet even they did not 
contend that the Constitution absolutely bars the capture and non-criminal detention of alleged enemy combatants 
within the United States.  al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 228-31 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment). 
164 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the habeas corpus petition of an 
American citizen captured in the United States who was being held as an enemy combatant without reaching the 
legality of his detention). 
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considered run-of-the-mill nonpunitive regulatory action. Those who would preserve it are left 
with only a last-ditch appeal to the political branches’ war powers.  
 Of course, defending IEEPA designation of U.S. persons on such grounds requires 
accepting the premise that an infinite global war—unbounded by space and time—is being 
waged everywhere and anywhere, including on our own soil.  John Yoo argues the Supreme 
Court has implied approval of this dramatic conception of the relationship between the United 
States and al-Qaeda.165 Other scholars fiercely disagree.166  What is certain is that we would pay 
a steep price in surrendered liberties if we ask courts to conceptualize our homes as bunkers and 
our backyards as battlefields.  It is difficult to imagine that the President’s rarely utilized power 
to designate U.S. persons as SDGTs is truly worth such a tradeoff. 
 Moreover, even subscribing to such an argument does not preserve IEEPA designation as 
we know it.  Terrorism is unique.  It is the only national emergency U.S. presidents have 
declared under IEEPA that can be plausibly termed a war.  The other declared “national 
emergenc[ies]” that pose “unusual and extraordinary threat[s] . . . to the national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States”167 do not create an immediate threat of catastrophic 
                                                 
165 John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 576-77 (2006) (“America waged previous conflicts on 
foreign battlefields, while the home front remained safe behind the distances of two oceans.  In the present conflict, 
the battlefield can exist anywhere, and there is no strict division between the front and home.”); Id. at 580 (“If 
September 11, for example, merely constituted a criminal act rather than an act of war, then Hamdi’s detention was 
illegal under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . .”). 
166 For typical pieces debating the proposition that we are at war on our own soil, see Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a 
War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban 
Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2002); Fiss, supra note 140, at 237 
(“Padilla’s habeas petition struck a note of urgency.  The government held him as an enemy combatant, but the war 
that the government had in mind was not the kind that had been fought in Afghanistan, and for which international 
law allows the belligerents to detain enemy combatants.  Rather, it was the vast, ill-defined, and never ending ‘War 
Against Terrorism.’”); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767, 776-77 
(2002) (“The war against terrorism threatens to form a backdrop to an increasing garrison state authority evoking the 
shadowy war that forms the background to Geroge Orwell’s novel, 1984.  This new, low level, but always prevalent 
‘warm’ war, has the potential to lead us back to the worst abuses of the Cold War.”). 
167 50 U.S.C. § 1701. 
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attack on the homeland, nor have they produced attacks on U.S. soil in the past.168  Thus, even if 
we can spare the liberties we’d lose by accepting as law the claim that we are living in a war 
zone, IEEPA designation of U.S. persons would be available as a potential solution to far fewer 
problems.169 
 Most importantly, the argument that IEEPA designation could be used against Americans 
during an armed conflict in the United States is entirely hypothetical.  As the years without an al-
Qaeda attack on the American homeland turn into a decade, and Federal prosecutors and FBI 
agents continue to disrupt terrorist plots,170 the argument that we are fighting a war on our own 
soil becomes less and less persuasive.  The continuing sacrifices of American soldiers in two 
foreign theaters of war only highlight the fact that the United States is not a war zone.  In the 
absence of an increasingly unlikely judicial determination that we are fighting a war within our 




                                                 
168 In practice, U.S. presidents have put IEEPA designation to use with great emphasis on “foreign policy” and 
relatively little attention to “emergency.”  For example, international drug trafficking, Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 
Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Oct. 24, 1995), and the repression of democratic politics by the governments of Belarus, Exec. 
Order No. 13,405, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,485 (June 20, 2006); and Zimbabwe, Exec. Order No. 13,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 
11,457 (Mar. 10, 2003), are among the situations that presidents have declared national emergencies.  All serious 
threats to American interests, to be sure, but not necessarily “state[s] of national crisis or . . . situation[s] requiring 
immediate and extraordinary national action,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining “national 
emergency”), let alone wars being fought on American soil.   
169 The one currently declared national emergency beyond terrorism that might arguably rise to the level of a war 
occurring within American borders is “the actions of significant foreign narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia, 
and the unparalleled violence corruption, and harm that they cause in the United States and abroad,” Exec. Order 
No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Oct. 24, 1995), given the incredible level of violence that plagues northern Mexico 
and the southwestern United States.  See, e.g., Marc Lacey & Ginger Thompson, Obama’s Next Foreign Crisis 
Could Be Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at 1. 
170 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 165, at 577 (“Law enforcement has uncovered al Qaeda cells in ciites such as Buffalo, 
New York and Portland, Oregon.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION  
 IEEPA designation’s failure of the Mendoza-Martinez test is a reminder that our current 
constitutional law treats foreign entities much differently than it treats U.S. persons.171  Tactics 
that are unremarkable when employed abroad, such as the blockade, may be impermissible when 
used at home.  Notably, the government’s new focus on preempting terrorist acts has prompted a 
small step towards the destabilization of the strict boundary between the foreign and the 
domestic.172  Now that the most fear-inducing existential threat to the state is as likely to 
materialize from within our borders as from without, it may well be time to ask whether 
geographic and national distinctions still deserve their central place in our constitutional law.  
Until our jurisprudence abandons such distinctions, however, the Bill of Rights continues to 
constrain the state’s ability to deprive U.S. persons of liberty in the name of our national 
security. 
 Whether the unconstitutionality IEEPA designation of U.S. persons is good or bad from a 
policy perspective is a different question entirely.  Surely, IEEPA designation is an important 
tool in keeping Americans safe and furthering American interests.  Yet the vast majority of 
IEEPA designees are not U.S. persons, and perhaps the relative lack of U.S. designees indicates 
that that IEEPA designation is not one of the President’s critical tools.  On the other hand, 
perhaps the rarity with which the Bush Administration employed IEEPA designation at home 
indicates that even the most aggressively counterterrorism-focused executive branch will not 
abuse the awesome power of IEEPA. 
 With so much ink spilled in the preceding pages on what is wrong with IEEPA, it is 
important to recognize the great good IEEPA has been used to support.  Beyond terrorism, 
                                                 
171 See sources cited supra note 31. 
172 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
46 
 
designation is used to fight narcotics trafficking,173 nuclear proliferation,174 and human rights 
abuses from Burma175 to Liberia176 and the Sudan.177  The Constitution leaves most executive 
branch actions taken pursuant to IEEPA untouched, and no matter what the ultimate outcome of 
any future constitutional litigation, the Departments of Treasury, State, and Justice will continue 
to have the option of using IEEPA designation against non-U.S. persons. 
 That does not mean, however, that the development of a clearer Mendoza-Martinez-test is 
without broader implications for U.S. foreign policy and counterterrorism efforts.  The natural 
question going forward is whether there are other preemptive counterterrorism measures 
currently in use that may skirt the edges of the civil/criminal divide.  No fly lists and terrorist 
watch lists come to mind.  The recent scholarly and policymaker enthusiasm for creating a 
preventive detention regime outside of the criminal process178 worth also ought to be considered 
with an eye towards Mendoza-Martinez-test review.  Of course, such measures differ from each 
other and IEEPA in substantial ways, but each would prove a fascinating and significant topic of 
study.  Indeed, as we work towards a clearer conception of punishment and a more coherent 
                                                 
173 Office of Foreign Assets Control, Counter Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/ 
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174 Office of Foreign Assets Control, Weapons of Mass Destruction/Non-Proliferation Sanctions, 
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application of the Mendoza-Martinez test, there will be much more work to do as we consider the 
constitutionality of our government’s efforts to keep us safe and free. 
 
